



# Frederick H. Hackeman CAMP 85

June 2024

## Editor's Notes

Brothers,

We are forever in the process of recruiting new members. As camp 85 Junior Vice-commander I am responsible for the following tasks:

- (a) Contacting prospective Brothers whose names are supplied to the Camp by the Department Junior Vice Commander.\*
- (b) Supplying prospective Brothers with membership materials including two membership applications, a copy of a SUVCW organization descriptive leaflet, and an invitation to the next Camp meeting.
- (c) Keeping track of applicants' progress in completing membership applications.
- (d) Encouraging delinquent Brothers to remain in the Order.
- (e) Presiding at Camp meetings in the absence of both the Camp Commander and Senior Vice Camp Commander.
- (f) Carrying out other responsibilities delegated to the office by the Camp bylaws, Camp and Camp Commander.



\*This certainly doesn't preclude developing our own prospects via our personal contacts and memberships in other organizations.

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**Next Camp Meeting**  
**June 13, 2024 - 6:30 p.m.**

Location - Lincoln Twp Library, 2099 W John Beers Rd, Stevensville

**Camp Communicator**

Sons of the Union Veterans of the Civil War



# LOGISTICS AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: Part Two

By  
Oscar J. Dorr, CPL, Fellow

*Reprinted from the Camp 4 Florida Dept newsletter with permission of the Editor*

A logistical problem not often discussed was that of replacement of supplies. Boots wore out rapidly on foot soldiers that literally walked everywhere. Wagons required replacement and repair. The North early saw the wisdom of standardization and employed the principle in manufacture of new wagons, simplifying spare and repair parts. Replacement of draft animals killed in combat, or worn out by long marches and short rations, was a serious problem.





Another logistical problem was the amount of baggage carried in the supply wagons to support the officers. Troops generally carried tent shelter halves which, when connected together, provided shelter for two soldiers.

General officers had the highest allowance for baggage, followed by the lesser ranks. A full regiment was allowed six wagons, an Army Corps headquarters four wagons, and a division or brigade three wagons, just for baggage. General Meigs, Quartermaster of the Union Army, stopped privates from carrying carpet bags or valises in the regimental wagons, and stopped sutlers' commercial goods from being carried in regimental or quartermaster wagons disguised as quartermaster or commissary stores. He also restricted officers' baggage to "ordinary mess-chest and a valise or carpet bag." No trunks or boxes were allowed.

In order to deliver 500 tons of goods per day on the march, the number of wagons required increased from 1,440 wagons for a two day march, 2,260 wagons for three days, and 3,140 wagons for four days, to as many as 7,500 wagons to support an eight day march. Each wagon was pulled by from four to six mules or horses. So 7,500 wagons required from 35,000 to 45,000 animals and possibly 15,000 drivers just to support a drive of little more than a week. These animals had to be fed, partially from fodder carried in the supply train, and partially from forage along the route of advance.

The Union Army of the Potomac consisted of 140,000 men, 4,300 wagons, 21,628 mules,




8,889 horses and 216 pack mules. The ratio of wagons to men was initially 30-32 per 1000 men, later reduced to about 20 per 1,000. The ratio of one animal to support four men remained fairly constant.

Food was a continuing problem for the CSA. The South had to convert from cotton to food crops, and the change-over was slow. Financing for procurement was a problem.

Railways could not always deliver on time. In my opinion, Jefferson Davis' inaction regarding taking over control of the railroads was a significant factor in loss of the war from a logistics viewpoint. He delayed signing the Railroad Priority Bill into law until May 1, 1863, but, even then, the Confederate Congress withheld administrative authority, and failed to confirm the Office of Railroad Superintendent. In spite of these problems, the armies kept to the field. There was no military priority system over the Southern railroads, so military supplies often were bypassed in favor of commercial goods producing a higher revenue.

Training of troops consisted mainly of drilling troops to form a line of battle, changing direction by 90 degrees, and forming a defense square. Troops rarely fired from the prone position. They knelt or stood. Defense was easier than offense. Even in the heat of battle, formation maneuvers worked well. Units stayed organized and were generally effective. The defense tended to use artillery more effectively than offense.

One of the major logistics losses early in the war was the loss of Nashville, TN, by the Confederates in early 1862. General Don Carlos Buell was the Northern general responsible for the capture. Nashville was an important logistics center for the South, the largest and most important south of the Ohio River. On the Cumberland River, it had extensive rail connections, a giant arsenal, two powder mills, and a huge supply depot. Nashville's industry produced 100,000 percussion caps for rifles a day. The Nashville Plow Works produced sabers for the cavalry. Other factories produced rifled guns (cannons) with plans stolen from a Northern arsenal. This victory helped convince the North that capture of logistics resources could have a great effect on the outcome of the war.



There was a strategy of penetration in the North's actions, while the South had initiated a policy of raiding. The first tended to be a long-term goal, and the second was carried out in the short-term. Actually, the goals of the North and South were different. The North needed to conquer the Southern states to force them back into the Union. The South did not wish, at first, to conquer the North. Its goal was simply to be so much trouble to the North as to be left alone to go its own way. As a personal aside, it seems to me that the South erred in taking the war into Northern territory, such as Pennsylvania. The sight of the original goal of secession seems to me to have been lost when the South

was caught up in the conflict, and winning and conquering seemed to become the goal. The South, by extending their areas of combat, extended their slim lines of logistics support. Had the South kept within its borders, and fought a defensive and guerilla type war, the outcome may have been entirely different. If attacked by superior forces, the Southern armies could have fallen back into friendly territory, consuming food, fodder and other critical supplies as the North advanced, leaving no forage or food for the advancing troops. The Southern forces could then have cut the North's supply lines, forcing a retreat. This may be a simplistic solution, but history shows that the logistics support problems for both the North and South were almost overwhelming.

By February 1862, the North had begun to see the advantages of logistics.

Secretary of War Stanton began to exert control over the railroads of the North. He ordered standardization of track widths, eliminating the need to off-load and re-load shipments at terminal connections where track size differed, a common problem of the time. He also set priorities for railroad car use, and established a uniform signal system for trains. Stanton made the railroads self-regulating under the thinly disguised threat of Congressional intervention and regulation.

The telegraph system, largely a railroad operation, was put under Army control. Later the entire railroad system was placed under Army control, though operated by the railroad companies.

The South had to rely largely on exports of cotton, and imports of hard goods, including war materials. There were ten Southern seaports, Norfolk, VA; New Bern, NC; Wilmington, NC; Charleston, SC; Savannah, GA; Jacksonville; Fernandina, and Pensacola, in Florida; Mobile, AL; and New Orleans, LA, that were capable of handling deep-water ships. By 1862, six of the ten had fallen to the Northern Army or Navy. There were only three shipyards in the South, at Norfolk, Pensacola and New Orleans. With both New Orleans and Pensacola in Northern hands, the South was hard-pressed to restore their shipping lost to the blockade. Along the Mississippi River, an important artery that soon came under the complete control of the North, Memphis was also captured in early 1862. Memphis was the terminus of four railroads, three running east, and one running south into Arkansas. Again, the South lost another important logistics center.

The North continued to increase its control of the logistics systems supporting the war effort. Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs and Secretary of War Stanton established a strong supply system. A quartermaster was established at each major point along the Ohio River. This evolved from a skeleton force into a major effort. The Quartermaster General procured uniforms, shoes, tents, horses, mules, forage, and wagons. The war effort used one-half of all the North's industrial output. As a result of the Quartermaster's efforts, the North was able to exploit the new process of machine sewing of shoes. This was no small contribution, giving the amount of walking the soldiers had to do. The Quartermaster also introduced the new French shelter tent, or shelter half. Two soldiers could each carry a half tent, tie them together at night, and avoid the necessity

of transporting by wagon the large tents formerly used. The U.S. Army used the shelter-half concept for many years after.

Brig. Gen. James W. Ripley, followed by Brig. Gen. Alexander B. Dyer, commanded the North's Ordnance Department effectively, though Ripley was the more conservative of the two. Dyer introduced breech-loading rifles, and greater precision in manufacturing, more uniformity in arms, and better product quality.

Loss of middle Tennessee for the South meant loss of the largest provision-raising area of the South. Other states had to convert from a cotton economy to a food economy, with some difficulty. Tennessee supplied meat, particularly hogs, and even iron for arms and other uses. Food was peculiarly a Southern problem. Meat was not rationed, so was uncontrolled.

For the South, resupply of animals (horse and mules) was inadequate to support the campaigns of the early war. The preferred sources were Virginia and North Carolina, but this presented a problem of distance. The lower south was not a horse or mule breeding area. Texas produced mustangs, but these were generally unsuitable for the war effort. Loss of territory in Missouri, Kentucky, west and middle Tennessee, and the Trans-Allegheny region of Virginia was a loss of the principle source of animals. Once a large purchase of draft animals was marooned on the west side of the Mississippi River, and prevented from crossing by Union control of the waterway.

Grain was very necessary for forage and subsistence, but was in short supply. Some 75% of Confederate States of America horse losses were from starvation, disease, or abandonment when too weak to be of service. Inadequate transportation and supply were big factors. The railroads refused to cooperate, in light of non-regulation, and refused to carry bulk fodder, preferring more lucrative cargo.

Transportation was a serious problem for both the North and South. The railroad favored strategic maneuver by the defender as they could retreat along the line if necessary. And the railroad provided supply input for the invader, but the defender could destroy railroad lines and bridges, and deprive the invader their use. Many units, both North and South would tear up tracks and burn the rails over a fire of railroad ties, bending the rails out of shape when red hot.



Sometimes it was possible to straighten the rails for re-use. The North developed a device to twist the rails as they were bent, so that re-use was impossible. Railway trestles were particularly vulnerable as most were built of wood, and could be destroyed, as one general put it, "by one soldier with a match." The Northern armies, with trained engineers and troops, frequently rebuilt wooden trestles of enormous size in a matter of days.

The Union Army completed other extraordinary construction projects. Col. Theodore Lyman, aide-de-camp to General George Meade, reported that once a pontoon bridge, 2,000 feet long, was built in 10 hours. Over this bridge passed a train of wagons and artillery 35 miles long; more than half the infantry in the Army of the Potomac, about 70,000 men; 3,400 beef cattle, and 4,000 cavalry -- all in only 48 hours. In civil life, a bridge like this, over a swift current and a depth of 85 feet, would require 2-3 months planning and collecting material, and a year to build.

Roads were generally narrow and, of course, unpaved. In a rainstorm, roads could become a sea of mud, literally sinking the heavily loaded wagons, and blocking an entire advance. The Union Army had the capability to build corduroy roads by felling trees along the way and laying the trunks crossways in the road with dirt piled on and smoothed. In this way the Union armies could advance in bad weather.

The South suffered from a severe parochial attitude on the part of many of the states and their governors. Local defense was put ahead of the Confederate cause. Many Southern governors were balky about supplies, particularly Zebulon Vanca of North Carolina. He refused military space in blockade shipments, because profit on civilian goods was so high. He also refused to allow the distillation of grain to make alcohol for whiskey for antiseptic



## Officers 2018 - 2019

Camp Commander:

Rex Dillman

SVC: Rex Dillman

JVC: Steven Williams

Secretary :Ray Truhn

Treasurer : Ray Truhn

Council 1: Charles L Pfauth Jr

Council 2: Keith Chapman

Council 3: Charles L Pfauth Sr

Patriotic Instructor:

Ted Chamberlain

Chaplain : Steven Williams

Graves & Memorials:

Rex Dillman

Historian: Rex Dillman

Signals Officer:

Steven Williams

Guide: Jeff Chubb

Guard: Jeff Chubb

Color Bearer: Rex Dillman

JROTC contact: Unassigned

Editor

Steve Williams

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and anesthesia substitutes because it was against state law. He stockpiled shoes and clothing in North Carolina while troops in Virginia were fighting barefoot.

Overall, the South did an excellent job of supplying arms, but did much poorer in establishment of managerial controls and adequate transportation capability, a fundamental logistics responsibility.

The South did often excel in cleverness in tactics. When supply limitations forced Gen. Beauregard to evacuate Corinth, MS in May 1862, he pulled off one of the greatest hoaxes of the war. During the night bugle calls were heard and drum rolls as trains arrived in Corinth. These were clearly heard by the Northern forces. Cheers from the soldiers went up as they welcomed each new arrival. Gen. Halleck, the Union general, concluded that the rebels were reinforcing to attack. At dawn, Gen. Halleck's men opened fire with their big guns, and were puzzled when no fire was returned. They could see enemy gun muzzles and Confederate caps peeking from behind the trench lines. Finally the Yankees discovered a white flag flying from a support. Investigation in daylight revealed the gun muzzles to be log ends painted black and the caps mounted on scarecrows. The arriving trains with supposed reinforcements had been empty and were engaged in hauling troops out of town. Beauregard compounded the hoax by removing all road signs that were an indispensable guide in this era of poor maps.

Lee earlier had not been concerned with logistics, but made it his dominant theme after he had rescued Richmond from a state of siege. Supply needs made protection of territory a paramount goal in his strategy. Following the success of Second Bull Run in the East in September 1862, Lee took advantage of his position in Virginia, and the supplies of rich and productive districts to supply his army. After turning the Union position at Washington, he planned to enter Maryland and collect supplies. This would permit him to annoy and harass the enemy until winter when, having exhausted forage and subsistence, he would have to fall back to a railroad to supply men and animals through the winter. This strategy allowed him to supply his army and protect the harvest in Virginia by spending the fall months in a logistically lucrative Maryland position.

Logistics continued to be a strategic weapon used by both sides. In Tennessee, Confederate General Kirby Smith was applying pressure on U.S. General George Morgan at Cumberland Gap. Realizing that Smith was passing around him, Morgan elected to hold fast as he had five weeks of supplies on hand. He realized that Smith could remain no more than three weeks in his rear due to a lack of supplies. In addition, he directed a small cavalry force to fall back before Smith's advance, destroying all forage, and driving all cattle along the route before it, denying them and the forage to Smith's troops and animals. Sherman also practiced the same concept of attacking Southern logistics by seizing or burning properties and supplies.

But logistics problems struck both sides. General George McClellan, after the Battle of Antietam, failed to press Lee in retreat. He felt unable to cross the river in pursuit of the retreating enemy because the means of transportation at his disposal was inadequate to furnish a full day's subsistence in advance. So his plan of attack was delayed by lack of shoes, clothing and draft animals for field transportation. Logistics frequently limited follow-up of a retreating enemy because, as the enemy retreated, he consumed resources from the countryside, while the pursuer

had to bring supplies forward to keep up with the advance.

Northern recruitment and promotion policies contributed to problems in fielding effective regiments. As older, experienced regiments were reduced in size by battlefield attrition, instead of being filled up from the bottom with new recruits, and promotion of deserving non-coms and officers, new regiments were formed, letting the old ones dwindle away. This deprived many regiments of the opportunity of having experienced, battle-wise veterans leading them.

Another logistics factor not usually thought of as important was the supply of salt. Used both in the flavoring and preservation of meat, salt was an important logistics item. Federal attacks on Florida's West Coast salt sources were extremely effective, though difficult to accomplish. The large size of the salt making equipment, in particular the heavy pots, and the small size of the raiding parties, usually put ashore from boats, made it far more than a simple task.

The siege of Vicksburg caused great hardships on both civilian and military populace of the city. First being cut to half rations, and then one-quarter, hungry soldiers ate bread made of cowpeas, mule meat, rats, and young shoots of cane. The loss of Vicksburg was a measurable disaster. The Federals lost 4,910 during the siege, while the Confederates lost 2,872 killed, wounded or missing, before losing the entire army by surrender. The captives numbered 2,166 officers, 27,230 enlisted men, and 115 civilian employees. They also lost 172 cannon, large amounts of every type of ammunition, and over 60,000 rifles. The rifles were of such good quality that many Union regiments exchanged their weapons for those stacked by the Confederates at their capture.

In the meantime, Lee's army stood before Meade's in Pennsylvania.

Logistics problems plagued the troops. With his army concentrated, Lee found it difficult to forage for supplies. So, on July 4, 1863, the Confederates began to move toward Hagerstown. A Union force had destroyed the Potomac bridge in their rear, so the Confederates could not draw supplies from the south. Even though he managed to dig in at a strong tactical position north of the river, with plenty of ammunition, he could not procure subsistence. The river in flood affected the stock of flour, as the mills could not be worked. Thus supply problems caused Lee to give up his toehold in the north. The river was crossed by improvising pontoons, built by tearing down abandoned house for their timber, then floating the logs downstream to be linked and floored. It was a good bridge, though somewhat crazy in design.

Pillaging, as a logistics tactic, generally was very effective. Grant found many hogs, sheep, cattle, poultry, and much corn on the drive to Vicksburg to feed his men. But the militia harassed Lee's forages in Pennsylvania. Though the militia was not useful in battle, it was effective against men searching for food and fodder. During General Sherman's famous march through Georgia (even infamous from a Georgian's viewpoint) he used pillaging as a logistics strategy.

The army took 13,000 head of cattle, and the equivalent of 6,000,000 rations of beef and bread. They also took 7,000 horses and mules, killing many more.

They destroyed 90,000 bales of cotton, and numerous sawmills, cotton gins, foundries, textile mills and warehouses worth more than \$100,000,000.

The Civil War was the debut of mobile logistics, using railroads to bring food and fodder forward. It was readily apparent that a long war requires more logistics support.

In summary, all three branches of the art of war--logistics , strategy and tactics--played crucial and interrelated roles in the Civil War, but more or less their relative importance was in that order. Tactically, Civil War armies were able to hurt each other-sometimes badly -- but mutually and indecisively. Poorly chosen tactics rendered higher casualty lists on both sides. The war was decided by the formulation and execution of superior strategy, psychological damage, and the scale-tipping impact of logistics. Lack of railroad support, and having to wage war by improvisation probably helped significantly to cost the South victory.

### Bibliography:

The author has relied heavily on secondary research in preparation of this paper, utilizing numerous sources. Among the major sources used were:

- Hagerman, Edward, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare, 1988
- Hattaway, Herman and Jones, Archer, How The North Won, 1991
- Jones, Archer , Civil War Command and Strategy, 1992
- Turner, George, Victory Rode the Rails, 1953

### Biography of the Author

Oscar J. Dorr, C.P.L. and Fellow, has more than 50 years experience as a professional logistician with government , industry, and academia . He is currently adjunct professor of Logistics Engineering at the University of Central Florida, where he has taught for nine years, and is a consultant to industry. He also has served on the faculties of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and Brevard Junior College. He originated the short engineering course at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) on Logistics Program Management, which he taught for four years. He has served on the Society of Logistics Engineers (SOLE) Board of Directors and Executive Board. He has written numerous articles for the SOLE Spectrum, presented papers at two Symposiums, was guest dinner speaker at FlaLog98, and has served on numerous SOLE committees. He wrote the definitions of Combat Logistics and Operational Logistics for the Society in response to a request from the DOD. In 1985-86 he served as Chapter Chairman of the Orlando Chapter, and served as Finance Chairman of the 1988 SOLE International Symposium. He is a Charter, Senior, and Life Member of SOLE, and a Life Member of the Logistics Education Foundation (LEF). He also holds certification as a Certified Data Manager and Certified Configuration Manager. He is retired from Rockwell International, Singer-Link, AAI, and DME Corporations, and served as Manager or Director of Logistics for each.



## From Page 1

We have coming up this weekend the annual Flag day parade in Three Oaks. I have sent out the documents that the organizing committee had finally sent me. There are 124 parade units signed up. We are number 58. We had asked to be placed with other military units (a,k,a, American legion posts etc) but we were not so placed. We are between Biggest Little Baseball Museum and Pat Rickerman. Well away from what we asked for. AmLeg Posts are in the 20s and the D.A.R. is at #32 another patriotic lineage organization. So, it would seem to me that they don't give us any respect.

# Battle of Fort Pillow

The Battle of Fort Pillow, which ended with the Fort Pillow massacre, was fought on April 12, 1864, at Fort Pillow on the Mississippi River in Henning, Tennessee, during the American Civil War. The battle ended with a massacre of African-American Union troops and their white officers attempting to surrender, by soldiers under the command of Confederate Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Military historian David J. Eicher concluded, "Fort Pillow marked one of the bleakest, saddest events of American military history."

Fort Pillow became the most controversial battle of the war. That a massacre occurred is not the issue; one did. The question is whether General Nathan Bedford Forrest, the commander, ordered the massacre (as the Union press immediately claimed), knew of but did nothing to halt or even encouraged the massacre, or, as Forrest later alleged, had nothing to do with the spontaneous action of soldiers enraged at seeing former slaves fighting them with guns.

The Fort Pillow massacre became a major political issue in the North, and increased support for the war. Historians and official reports emphasize a deliberate massacre took place. Confederate sources say they kept firing in self-defense. Survivors claimed that even though the Union troops surrendered, Forrest's men massacred them in cold blood. Surviving members of the garrison said that most of their men surrendered and threw down their arms, only to be shot or bayoneted by the attackers, who repeatedly shouted, "No quarter! No quarter!" Women and children were also killed:

The rebels commenced an indiscriminate slaughter, sparing neither age nor sex, white nor black soldier nor civilian. The officers and men seemed to vie with each other in the devilish work. Men, women and their children, wherever found, were deliberately shot down, beaten and hacked with sabres. Some of the children, not more than ten years old, were forced to stand up and face their murderers while being shot. The sick and wounded were butchered without mercy, the rebels even entering the hospital buildings and dragging them out to be shot, or killing them as they lay there unable to offer the least resistance.

There were also atrocities:

One man was deliberately fastened down to the floor of a tent, face upward, by means of nails driven through his clothing and into the boards under him, so that he could not possibly escape, and then the tent was set on fire. Another was nailed to the side of a building outside of the fort, and then the building was set on fire and burned.

Two negro soldiers, wounded at Fort Pillow, were buried by the rebels, but afterward worked themselves out of their graves.

The next morning, "the demons carefully sought among the dead lying about in all di-

rections for any other wounded yet alive, and those they found were deliberately shot."

The Joint Committee On the Conduct of the War immediately investigated the incident, which was widely publicized in the Union press. (Stories appeared April 16 in the New York Times, New York Herald, New-York Tribune, Chicago Tribune, Cincinnati Gazette, and St. Louis Missouri Democrat, based on telegraph reports from Cairo, Illinois, where the steamer Platte Valley, carrying survivors, had called so that they could be taken to a hospital at nearby Mound City, Illinois, and those that had expired on the ship could be buried.) In their report, from which the previous quotes were taken, they concluded that the Confederates shot most of the garrison after it had surrendered.

A letter from one of Smith's own sergeants, Achilles V. Clark, writing to his sisters on April 14, reads in part:

*Our men were so exasperated by the Yankee's threats of no quarter that they gave but little. The slaughter was awful. Words cannot describe the scene. The poor deluded negros would run up to our men fall on their knees and with uplifted hands scream for mercy but they were ordered to their feet and then shot down. The whitte [sic] men fared but little better. The fort turned out to be a great slaughter pen. Blood, human blood stood about in pools and brains could have been gathered up in any quantity. I with several others tried to stop the butchery and at one time had partially succeeded but Gen. Forrest ordered them shot down like dogs and the carnage continued. Finally our men became sick of blood and the firing ceased.*

Forrest himself called it "the wholesale slaughter of the garrison at Fort Pillow".



By Source: NYPL., Public Domain, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=7814312>

Caption in Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper (New York), May 7, 1864- "The war in Tennessee: Confederate massacre of black Union troops after the surrender at Fort Pillow, April 12, 1864"

# Berrien County in the American Civil War

The following Michigan units had most or some Berrien County men on their rosters. In the next issues of the Camp Communicator, each unit will have a brief history of its participation which should include battles, discharge date, commendations, and a listing of known Berrien County soldiers. The initial unit covered in this issue will be the 1st Michigan Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment - African-American, later 102nd Regiment United States Colored Troops

Source: *History of Berrien and Van Buren Co's Michigan, D. W. Ensign & Co. 1880*

## ***Infantry***

1st Michigan Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment - African-American, later 102nd Regiment United States Colored Troops  
6th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment  
9th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment  
12th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment  
13th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment  
17th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment - Stonewall Regiment  
19th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment  
24th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment  
25th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment  
28th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment

## ***Sharpshooters***

1st Regiment Michigan Volunteer Sharpshooters Cavalry  
1st Michigan Volunteer Cavalry Regiment  
2nd Michigan Volunteer Cavalry Regiment  
3rd Michigan Volunteer Cavalry Regiment  
4th Michigan Volunteer Cavalry Regiment  
7th Michigan Volunteer Cavalry Regiment  
9th Michigan Volunteer Cavalry Regiment  
11th Michigan Volunteer Cavalry Regiment

## ***Artillery***

1st Regiment Michigan Light Artillery

## ***Engineers***

1st Regiment Michigan Volunteer Engineers and Mechanics

### **1st Michigan Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment - African-American,**

This regiment was first known as the 1st Regiment of Michigan Colored Infantry, but its name was changed by the War Department to the one given at the head of this sketch. It contained about fifty men from Berrien County and twenty from Van Buren, scattered through all the companies, the largest number being in Company G. The regiment was raised in the winter of 1863-64, and left its rendezvous at Detroit on the 28th of March, 1864. It joined the 9th Army Corps at Annapolis, but on the 15th of April was detached and embarked for Hilton Head, S. C., where it arrived on the 19th. For a month it guarded in detachments various points on the coast of South Carolina, and was then concentrated at Port Royal. On the 1st of August it proceeded by sea to Jacksonville, Fla., but only remained in that State during that month. It made several long marches, but was only once engaged with the enemy. Some rebel cavalry attacked it on the 11th of August, but they were easily repulsed. During the last days of August the regiment returned to Beaufort, S. C., where it was employed on picket and fatigue duty in that vicinity until the 30th of November. Three hundred men then joined Gen. Foster's command at Boyd's Landing. It was engaged with



## ***Meeting Schedule***

Our meeting schedule is every month between March through November meeting on the 3rd Thursday of the month except as noted. At 6:30 PM.

Location -

Currently -  
Lincoln Twp  
Public Library



7th corps Kepi patch



the enemy at Honey Hill, on the 30th of November, at Tullifinny, on the 7th of December, and at Devereaux Neck, on the 9th, having during the three conflicts sixty-five officers and men killed and wounded out of the three hundred.

The whole regiment was concentrated at Devereaux Neck on the 24th of January, 1865. It moved to Pocotaligo, and remained there until the 7th of February. It then took part in various operations against Charleston, and the 27th of that month took post on Charleston Neck. On the 9th of March it went by sea to Savannah, Ga., and on the 1st of April returned to Georgetown, S. C.

On the 9th of April the right wing landed in Charleston, S. C, and on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of that month marched to the Santee River, driving back the enemy's cavalry, which annoyed it on the last day of the march. It also had a skirmish with the enemy on the 18th while marching towards Camden. The left wing having marched from Georgetown on the 5th of April, under Gen. Potter, reached Manning on the 9th, after heavy skirmishing with the enemy, and then proceeded towards Camden. On the 16th it skirmished with the Confederates at Spring Hill. It reached Camden on the 17th, and the next day returned towards Manchester. About five miles out it met the enemy in force, but with the 54th Massachusetts (colored) it drove them back towards Stateburg.

On the 19th, the two wings having united, the regiment et the Confederates near Singleton's plantation, where it made a flank movement which compelled them to retire in great haste. On the morning of the 21st of April, while Company A was on picket, it was attacked by some two hundred of the enemy, who were handsomely repulsed. The same day the Confederate commander sent a flag of truce stating that Gens. Sherman and Johnston had ceased hostilities. This virtually closed the war, and Company A of the 102nd fired and received almost if not quite the last shots in the conflict.

### **BERRIEN COUNTY SOLDIERS IN THE ONE HUNDRED AND SECOND UNIT- ED STATES COLORED TROOPS.**

#### **Company A,**

Stephen Busbee, must, out Sept. 30, ISC').  
Joshua Emmons, Died of Disease in South Carolina,  
July 4, 1864  
Anthony Nash, must. out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Robert Ogden, Died of disease in South Carolina, Feb.  
6, 1865.

#### **Company B.**

John Battles, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
James T. Battles, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
George Brown, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Ezekiel Harris, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
William Linsey, disch for disability, Aug. 11, 1864.  
Levi Mitchell, disch. by order, May 24, 1864.

#### **Company C**

William Adams, disch. for disability, June 16, 1865.

#### **Company D.**

Henry Harris, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Abner A. Mitchell, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.

#### **Company E.**

Sergt. Eli Smith, Niles; enl. Nov. 30, 1863; absent,  
sick, at muster out  
Nathan Hall, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
William P. Minnis, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.

#### **Company F.**

George Vincent, Must. out Sept. 30, 1865.

#### **Company G.**

Sergt. Wm. Powers, Niles; enl. Oct. 28, 1863; must,  
out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Sergt. Harrison Johnson, Niles; enl. Dec. 26, 1863;  
must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Corp. John Lett, Sodus; enl. Jan 2, 1864; died of  
disease in South Carolina, June 24, 1865.  
Corp. Benj. T. Coleman, Sodus; enl. Jan. 24, 1864;  
died of disease in New York, Jan. 6, 1865.  
Corp. Miner Rivers, Niles; enl. Dec. 26, 1863;  
must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Wm. Buchanan, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Benj. J. Cozzens, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Jos. Dickinson, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Andrew Farmer, disch. for wounds, May 26, 1865.  
Lewis Gibney, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Washington Gibney, must. out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Ashberry Hackley, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Marcellus Hackley, must. out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Edward Hicks, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Needham Miller, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Samuel McLean must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Geo. W. Patterson, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
John Stephens, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.

#### **Company H.**

Corp. George Jackson, Chickaming; enl. Dec. 31,  
1863; must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Thos. Buck, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Steph. A. Douglass, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Geo. H. Hicks, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Willis Littleton, must, out Sept. .30, 1865.  
Jacob Steele, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Benj. A. Woodruff, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.

#### **Company I.**

Sergt. Edward Firiley, Niles; enl. Jan. 21, 1864;  
must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Corp. John Wright, Niles; enl. Jan. 13, 1864; must,  
out Sept. 30, 1865.  
Edwin Crowder, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.

Abram Love, died of disease at Detroit, Feb. 13, 1864.  
Wm. Norman, died of disease in South Carolina, Feb. 4, 1865.

### Company K.

Wm. Bailey, absent, sick, at muster out.  
Isaac Horden, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.  
John Metchum, must, out Sept. 30, 1865.



## Book Review The Bloody Shirt


by Stephen Budiansky

A gripping look at terrorist violence during the Reconstruction era

Between 1867, when the defeated South was forced to establish new state governments that fully represented both black and white citizens, and 1877, when the last of these governments was overthrown, more than three thousand African Americans and their white allies were killed by terrorist violence. Drawing on original letters and diaries as well as published racist diatribes of the time, acclaimed historian Stephen Budiansky concentrates his vivid, fast paced narrative on the efforts of five heroic men—two Union officers, a Confederate general, a Northern entrepreneur, and a former slave—who showed remarkable idealism and courage as they struggled to establish a New South in the face of overwhelming hatred and organized resistance. The Bloody Shirt sheds new light on the violence, racism, division, and heroism of Reconstruction, a largely forgotten but epochal chapter in American history.

Bloody shirt, in U.S. history, the post-Civil War political strategy of appealing to voters by recalling the passions and hardships of the recent war. This technique of “waving the bloody shirt” was most often employed by Radical Republicans in their efforts to focus public attention on Reconstruction issues still facing the country. Used in the presidential elections of 1868, 1872, and 1876, the strategy was particularly effective in the North in attracting veterans’ votes.

Waving the bloody shirt” and “bloody shirt campaign” were pejorative phrases, used during American election campaigns during the Reconstruction era, to deride op-



posing politicians who made emotional calls to avenge the blood of soldiers that died in the Civil War. The phrases were most often used against Radical Republicans, who were accused of using the memory of the Civil War to their political advantage. Democrats were not above using memories of the Civil War in such a manner as well, especially while campaigning in the South.

The phrases gained popularity with a fictitious incident of April 1871 in which U.S. Representative and former Union general Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts, while making a speech on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, supposedly held up a shirt stained with the blood of a Reconstruction Era carpetbagger who had been whipped by the Ku Klux Klan. Although Butler did give a speech condemning the Klan that month, he never waved anyone’s bloody shirt. White Southerners mocked Butler, using the fiction of his having “waved the bloody shirt”, to dismiss widespread Klan thuggery and other atrocities, including murder, committed against freed slaves and Republicans.

The Red Shirts, a defunct 19th-century white supremacist paramilitary organization, took their name from uniforms worn mocking the phrase.

In current usage, the terms are often shortened to bloody shirt and used more broadly to refer to any effort to stir up partisan animosity

# The Battle of Monocacy

In the summer of 1864, the American Civil War was still a long way from conclusion. Union and Confederate armies were still spread out across the country, with battles and campaigns still racking up casualties by the thousands. With Union forces under Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant deep in Virginia at Petersburg, Confederate General Robert E. Lee devised a bold plan. Lee ordered General Jubal Early to take the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia and link up with General John C. Breckenridge to clear the Shenandoah Valley. After securing the Valley, Early was to invade Maryland, putting pressure on the Federal capital, Washington, DC. By the first week of July, Confederates had entered Maryland and caught Union forces largely off guard. As the Federals scrambled to gather a defensive force, Major General Lew Wallace and roughly 3,200 inexperienced troops of the Middle Department, headed west from Baltimore, MD and took up a position just south of Frederick, MD at Monocacy Junction along the Monocacy River. Grant ordered the third division of the Sixth Corps north, hoping they would reach Maryland in time to slow Early's advance. By the morning of July 9th, nearly 6,600 Union troops had gathered near Monocacy Junction, with Wallace in command. Early's 15,000 Confederates were to the north in Frederick. The stage for battle was set.

The Battle of Monocacy began around 8:30 a.m. when Confederate skirmishers, commanded by General Stephen Ramseur, advanced south along the Georgetown Pike and encountered Union infantry near Monocacy Junction. Wallace placed troops north of Monocacy Junction and a wooden covered bridge that carried the pike over the Monocacy River, blocking Early's best route to Washington. Ramseur's division continued to pressure Union forces near Monocacy Junction throughout the day, but they were unable to drive back the Union defense, composed of troops from Maryland and Vermont.

After encountering resistance near Monocacy Junction, Confederates looked for another way to cross the river. Confederate General John McCausland's cavalrymen found the Worthington Ford almost a mile downriver of the wooden covered bridge, and by 10:30 a.m. had begun to cross, placing pressure on Wallace's forces south of the river. When Wallace learned of the Confederate presence south of the Monocacy, he ordered the wooden covered bridge burned to protect his new right flank as he shifted his main battle lines to the west onto the Thomas Farm.

The first Confederate attack south of the Monocacy began around 11:00 a.m., as McCausland's men advanced east and encountered Federal infantry from Union General James Ricketts's Sixth Corps division. McCausland was repulsed, and formed for another attack around 2:00 p.m., moving from the Worthington Farm toward the Thomas House. While the Confederates gained control of the Thomas Farm, they were soon pushed back by Federal forces in a savage counter attack.

In the midst of McCausland's second cavalry attack, help was on the way for the Confederates. Confederate General John B. Gordon's division forded the Monocacy River using the Worthington Ford and by mid-afternoon was ready to attack. Near 3:30 p.m. Gordon's three brigades swept forward en echelon from right, moving from Brooks Hill toward the Union line on the Thomas Farm. The fighting was fierce, with heavy casualties falling on both sides. The Union battle line began to waver and then fell back toward the Georgetown Pike. Confederates were able to threaten and eventually turn the Union right flank, Wallace had no choice but to retreat from the field to save his remaining men. By 5:00 p.m., the Federals were in full retreat to the east, and Confederates would take the field. During the fighting roughly 2,200 men had been killed, wounded, captured, or were listed as missing (900 Confed-



Field maps, like this one made of the Battle of Monocacy by Jedediah Hotchkiss, provided valuable aid to commanders planning battle strategies

erate, 1,300 Federal).

While the Confederates had won the Battle of Monocacy, Lew Wallace was ultimately successful. His efforts had delayed Jubal Early's advance long enough for additional Union reinforcements to reach Washington D.C. By the time Early's men reached the capital on July 11, help

had arrived in the Federal capital. Some fighting and skirmishing occurred near Fort Stevens on the city's outskirts, but Early was unable to take Washington. Early and his men withdrew back into Maryland and eventually crossed the Potomac River back into Virginia. Their campaign was over.




Monocacy was not one of the largest battles of the Civil War, but it had an impact much larger than many know. Early had successfully reached Washington, forcing Grant to send reinforcements northward, but his campaign was ultimately foiled by the delaying tactics of Lew Wallace and his men at Monocacy on July 9. Because of this, the Battle of Monocacy has forever been known as “The Battle That Saved Washington.”

[Right] Wallace returned to Indiana in 1867 to practice law, but the profession did not appeal to him, and he turned to politics. Wallace made two unsuccessful bids for a seat in Congress (in 1868 and 1870), and supported Republican presidential candidate Rutherford B. Hayes in the 1876 election. As a reward for his political support, Hayes appointed Wallace as governor of the New Mexico Territory, where he served from August 1878 to March 1881. His next assignment came in March 1881, when Republican president James A. Garfield appointed Wallace to an overseas diplomatic post in Constantinople as U.S. Minister to the Ottoman Empire. Wallace remained in this post until 1885.



Wallace confessed in his autobiography that he took up writing as a diversion from studying law. Although he wrote several books, Wallace is best known for his historical adventure story, Ben-Hur:

A Tale of the Christ (1880), which established his fame as an author



When the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered on April 9, 1865, Early escaped to Texas on horseback, hoping to find a Confederate force that had not surrendered. He proceeded to Mexico, and from there sailed to Cuba and finally reached (the then Province of) Canada. Despite his former Unionist stance, Early declared himself unable to live under the same government as the Yankee. While living in Toronto with some financial support from his father and elder brother, Early wrote A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence, in the Confederate States of America (1866), which focused on his Valley Campaign. The book became the first published by a major general about the war. Early spent the rest of his life defending his actions during the war and became known as the Lost Cause movement.

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## Book Review

### Michigan and the Civil War

by Jack Demsey.

Michigan undertook a rapid and robust response to Lincoln's call to arms during the Civil War and in many of its great battles. Read the much overlooked history in this volume.

With lively narration, telling anecdotes, and vivid battlefield accounts, Michigan and the Civil War tells the story as never before of Michigan's heroic contributions to saving the Union. Beginning with Michigan's antebellum period and anti-slavery heritage, the book proceeds through Michigan's rapid response to President Lincoln's call to arms, its participation in each of the War's greatest battles, portrayal of its most interesting personalities, and the concluding triumph as Custer corners Lee

at Appomattox and the 4th Michigan Cavalry apprehends the fleeing Jeff Davis. Based on thorough and up-to-date research, the result is surprising in its breadth, sometimes awe-inspiring, and always a revelation given how contributions by the Great Lake State in the Civil War are too often overlooked, even by its own citizens.

#### About the Author

Jack Dempsey, former assistant attorney general for the State of Michigan, is firmly embedded in the Michigan Civil War community. He runs a popular Michigan in the Civil War blog and is the vice-president of the Michigan Historical Commission, as well as a board member of the Michigan History Foundation and the Historical Society of Michigan. He is also a color bearer with the Civil War Preservation Trust. His website is <http://www.micwc.typepad.com>.



## The Confederate and neo-Confederate Reader

by Jack Demsey.

Most Americans hold basic misconceptions about the Confederacy, the Civil War, and the actions of subsequent neo-Confederates. For example, two thirds of Americans—including most history teachers—think the Confederate States seceded for “states’ rights.” This error persists because most have never read the key documents about the Confederacy.

These documents have always been there. When South Carolina seceded, it published “Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.” The document actually opposes states’ rights. Its authors argue that Northern states were ignoring the rights of slave owners as identified by Congress and in the Constitution. Similarly, Mississippi’s “Declaration of the Immediate Causes . . .” says, “Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery—the greatest material interest of the world.”

The 150th anniversary of secession and civil war provides a moment for all Americans to hear these documents, properly set in context by award-winning sociologist and historian James W. Loewen and coeditor, Edward H. Sebesta, to put in perspective the mythology of the Old South.

The book immediately distinguishes between history and historiography.

*...historiography means “the study of history,” but not just “studying history.” Historiography asks us to scrutinize how a given piece of history came to be written. Who wrote it? When? With whom were they in debate? What were they trying to prove? Who didn’t write it? What points of view were omitted?*

That alone is worth taking time to discuss. But Loewen and Sebesta waste no time getting to the crux of this book. The quote continues without a break:


*Especially on the subjects of slavery, secession, and race - the core of this volume- Confederate and neo-Confederate statements change depending upon where people wrote or spoke, and when and why. Why did Confederates say they seceded for slavery in 1861 but not in 1891? Why did neo-Confederates claim in 1999, but not in 1869, that thousands of African Americans served in the Confederate armed forces?...*

*What does all this mean, and why is it important?*

We’re living in a time when racists claim, “everything is racist” as a way to excuse their racism. It’s tough, because if you call someone who isn’t a racist a racist, the reaction is the same as when you call out a racist for their racism. The introduction to the book is, “Unknown Well-Known Documents.” It’s a collection of writings that are out there in the open. Articles of Secession. Speeches given in front of the Senate. Speeches by Jefferson Davis, and sermons given by Pastors in the South. Most of this isn’t stuff that’s hidden away, it’s just stuff that people don’t generally take the time to read on their own. I mean, we don’t read our own Constitution... let alone the Articles of Confederation. Why would we or should we read the Articles of Secession? Here’s why: it’s up to all of us to put down the casually and/or intentionally racist myths as they gain new footholds - and I’m not necessarily talking about Trump’s courting of white nationalists - this book came out in 2010. (In fact, this gets brought up in the introduction to the last section, “The Civil Rights Era, 1940-” “As of this writing (2010), it is too early to tell if having an African American in the White House will lead to a new era of race rela-

tions that will further marginalize neo-Confederates, or if it will prompt some of the almost 90% of whites in the Deep South who voted against Obama to coalesce, thus breathing new life into the neo-Confederate movement.” If feel like there are two answers to that question. One given in 2012, and one given in 2016... but that’s just me... Another reason is understanding how these Confederate and neo-Confederate myths promote racism. Sometimes it’s evident. Other times it’s less apparent. Like, does it really matter if I believe the Civil War was fought over slavery, state’s rights, or tariffs? First off, here are some of the myths the book addresses: **Claim:** The South seceded over state’s rights. Truth: The South seceded over slavery. (And white supremacy.) **Claim:** Slaves were treated well, and liked being slaves. Truth: ...? Come on. Again, sometimes it’s self-evident. Slaves did not like being slaves. **Claim:** Confederate monuments were put up to celebrate history. Truth: I mean... a bad reading of history, sure. But mostly to extend the legacy of white supremacy, and to send a message to the African-Americans in the cities and towns where they went up. **Claim:** The “Confederate Flag” isn’t even the Confederate Flag... it was a battle flag of the army of Northern... Truth: That’s true. But we all know why you have The Battle Flag of Northern Virginia as a license plate on the front of your car here in Northern Indiana. Both of your parents were born in Indiana. (I wasn’t going to include quotes yet, but here’s the reason they moved away from The Stars and Bars and onto The Stainless Banner, *“As a people, we are fighting to maintain the Heaven-ordained supremacy of the white man over the inferior colored race; a white flag would thus be emblematical of our cause...”* ...State’s Rights indeed...) **Claim:** Lincoln was a Republican. Truth: Yeah. But the parties flipped (mainly over race) in the 1960s. **Claim:** The parties didn’t actually flip in the 1960s. Truth: Yes, they did. Look at the maps. Did all the Republicans and Democrats just like... migrate and switch spots? Where did all the people go? There is SO much in this book worth reading. It’s all primary source, and commentary. For instance: Mississippi gives the reason they’re seceding... the first paragraph basically says, “we’re seceding.” The second paragraph says, *“Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery the greatest material interest in the world.”* Not really a “State’s Rights” argument. In fact, the South was against State’s Rights. They pushed for the Fugitive Slave Law - which allowed Southerners to pursue slaves into free states. But if they were really in favor of State’s Rights, as soon as that person set foot in a free state, the South should abide by the laws of THAT state. Same with Dred Scott. This goes back to historiography. WHY do people tell these false histories - that the South wasn’t really fighting over slavery. Ask yourself what purpose that serves? What does it mean if slavery was a non-issue? Who does that serve? Who does that false narrative serve today?

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The SVR roots date back to 1881 with the “Cadet Corps” of the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) – the largest Union Veterans organization which formed in 1866 after the Civil War. The members of the GAR encouraged the formation of their sons as the SUVCW in 1881. These units eventually became known as the Sons of Veterans Reserve, when the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War moved toward a more patriotic and educational organization in design.

Many of the Sons of Union Veterans Camps (local organizations) formed reserve military units which volunteered their services during the Spanish – American War, World War I, and with the National Guard. Just prior to World War I, over 5,000 men wore the blue uniform of the SVR. As late as the 1930’s, several states regarded their local SVR units as a military training component. Since World War II, the SVR has evolved into a ceremonial and commemorative organization. In 1962, the National Military Department was created by the SUVCW and consolidated the SVR units under national regulations and command. Since 1962, there have been five SUVCW Brothers that have held the SVR rank of Brigadier General and have had the honor to serve as the Commanding Officer of the SVR.

# Camp Training Aids

As located on the Department of Michigan web site. It is recommended that Camp members visit these URLs and familiarize themselves with the information contained within these documents.

Handbook of Instruction for the Department Patriotic Instructor  
<https://www.suvcwmi.org/hq/Department%20PI%20Handbook.pdf>

Handbook of Instruction for the Camp Patriotic Instructor  
Missing link

Handbook of Instruction for the Civil War Memorials Officer  
<https://www.suvcwmi.org/hq/Michigan%20CWM%20Handbook.pdf>

Department Membership Initiative  
<https://www.suvcwmi.org/hq/DeptMemInitiative.pdf>

Department of Michigan Member Recruitment & Retention Report  
<https://www.suvcwmi.org/hq/Dept%20of%20Michigan%20Member%20Recruitment%20&%20Retention.pdf>

National Chaplain's Handbook  
<https://www.suvcwmi.org/hq/Dept%20of%20Michigan%20Member%20Recruitment%20&%20Retention.pdf>

Recommended Education & Additional Department Officer Duties  
<https://www.suvcwmi.org/hq/Department%20Orders/Series%202017-18/Recommended%20Ed%20&%20Add%20Dept%20Officer%20Duties.pdf>



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## Donations to **SUVCW**

Can you write off donations to a 501 C 3?

Contributions to civic leagues or other section 501(c)(3) organizations generally are deductible as charitable contributions for federal income tax purposes. They may be deductible as trade or business expenses, if ordinary and necessary in the conduct of the taxpayer's business.

## Department of Michigan Officers

Commander -	Robert R. Payne, PCC
Senior VC -	Steven S Martin, CC
Junior VC -	Nathan Smith, CC
Members of the Council -	Robert R. Payne, PDC Nathan L. Smith, PDC David Smith PDC
Secretary -	Dick Denney,CC
Treasurer -	Bruce S.A. Gosling
Chief of Staff	Gary L. Gibson, PDC
Counselor -	Nathan L Smith PDC
Chaplain -	Rev. Charles Buckhahn, PCC
Patriotic Instructor -	Terry McKinch PDC
Color Bearer -	Edgar J. Dowd, PCC
Signals Officer -	Robert R. Payne, PDC
Editor, "Michigan's Messenger" -	Richard E. Danes, PCC
Historian -	David F Wallace PDC
Guide -	Leonard Sheaffer CC
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Graves Registration Officer-	Richard E. Danes, PCC
GAR Records Officer-	Gary L. Gibson, PDC
Civil War Memorials Officer-	Leonard Sheaffer CC
Eagle Scout Coordinator -	Lloyd Lamphere Sr PCC
Camp-At-Large Coordinator -	L. Dean Lamphere, Jr., PDC
Camp Organizer	James B. Pahl, PCinC
Military Affairs Officer -	Edgar J. Dowd, PCC
Aide de Camp	L. Dean Lamphere, Jr., PDC
Ceremonies and Rituals Officer	L. Dean Lamphere, Jr., PDC

The purpose of this newsletter is to inform the members of **Frederick H. Hackeman Camp 85** of activities and events related to the mission of the SUVCW and its interests.

If you wish to place a civil war article or SUVCW item please submit to the Editor at [sarwilliamssa@gmail.com](mailto:sarwilliamssa@gmail.com)

*The Editor reserves the right to censor and/or edit all material submitted for publication to the Camp Communicator newsletter without notice to the submitter.*

## Camp Website

Be sure and visit our Camp Website at <http://www.suvcwmi.org/camps/camp85.php>.

## Sutler Links

Link to list of vendors for any items to fill out your uniform and re-enactor accessories.

<http://www.fighting69th.org/sutler.html>

<http://www.ccsutlery.com/>

<http://www.crescentcitysutler.com/index.html>

<http://www.regtdqm.com/>

<http://www.cjdaley.com/research.htm>

<http://www.fcsutler.com/>

<https://www.militaryuniformsupply.com/civil-war-reenactment-clothing-gear>

## MICHIGAN'S MESSENGER

is a quarterly publication of and for the membership of the Department of Michigan, Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War.

## Ancestor Biographies Needed

Whatever you may have on your ancestor's life story submit for inclusion of future issues. It can be short or long as it takes to tell us about your ancestor's life, i.e., what he did before the war, where he served, and if he survived, what he did after the war - farmer, merchant, politician, etc. And if your family history has a photograph submit that, too.

## National Officers

Commander-in-Chief Peter J. Hritsko, Jr., PDC [CinC@suvcw.org](mailto:CinC@suvcw.org)  
Senior Vice CinC Kevin Martin, PDC [SVCinC@suvcw.org](mailto:SVCinC@suvcw.org)  
Junior Vice CinC Kevin P. Tucker PDC [JVCinC@suvcw.org](mailto:JVCinC@suvcw.org)  
National Secretary Daniel Murray, PDC [secretary@suvcw.org](mailto:secretary@suvcw.org)  
National Treasurer D. Michael Beard, PDC [treasurer@suvcw.org](mailto:treasurer@suvcw.org)  
National Quartermaster Robert Welch, PDC [qm@suvcw.org](mailto:qm@suvcw.org)

## Council of Administration

Council of Admin (24) Joseph S. Hall, Jr., PDC [CofA4@suvcw.org](mailto:CofA4@suvcw.org)  
Council of Admin (24) Shane Milburn, PDC [CofA2@suvcw.org](mailto:CofA2@suvcw.org)  
Council of Admin (26) Rodrick Fraser Jr [CofA6@suvcw.org](mailto:CofA6@suvcw.org)  
Council of Admin (25) Robert Payne, PDC [CofA3@suvcw.org](mailto:CofA3@suvcw.org)  
Council of Admin (25) Chris P. Workman, PDC [CofA5@suvcw.org](mailto:CofA5@suvcw.org)  
Council of Admin (Outgoing CinC) Bruce D. Frail [PCinC CofA1@suvcw.org](mailto:PCinC CofA1@suvcw.org)

## Non-voting

Banner Editor James B. Pahl, PCinC [banner@suvcw.org](mailto:banner@suvcw.org)  
National Signals Officer Tim McCoy [signalsofficer@suvcw.org](mailto:signalsofficer@suvcw.org)



# Upcoming Events

## National

Stay tuned for information about the 2024 National Encampment being hosted by our Brothers in the Department of Kentucky

The Campbell House, 1375 South Broadway, Lexington, KY 40504  
Dates: August 1 - August 4, 2024 Lexington, Kentucky

## Department

### *June 2024*

- 14 June , Friday - Flag Day

### *July 2024*

- 4 July, Thursday - Independences Day.

### *August 2024*

- 01-04 August, Thursday - Sunday - 2024 National Encampment, Lexington KY

## Camp

- *June 9, 2024* Three Oaks Flag DCay parade 1:00 pm - 5 pm
- *June 13, 2024* Camp meeting
- *July 4, 2024* LOCAL Independence Day activities as scheduled
- *July 18, 2024* Camp meeting
- *August 15, 2024* Camp meeting
- *September 19, 2024* Camp meeting
- *October 17, 2024* Camp meeting **Officer nominations**
- *November 21, 2024* Camp meeting **Officer Elections/Installations**

## SVR Dates to Note

**7 & 8 June 2024** - Curwood Days and Parade: Please reach out to Corporal Kimble david.kimble@suvcwmi.org . He will be setting up a camp on Friday and Saturday. Looking for assistance to do the parade at 2:00pm on Friday and interact with the public at the camp setup.

**22 June 2024:** Dexter Memorial Parade (0.8 mile down hill walk) Bicentennial Celebration  
9:00am Form up for parade (10:00am Step off) Might be a firing, details still being refined.  
Please let me know if there is interest.

**20 July 2024:** working on support with Brother Nagle for Centennial event.

**21 September 2024:** Participation with the Daughters of the Union at a plaque laying ceremony at Glenwood Cemetery and the Stockton House with lunch provided following the service. I need and NCO or Officer other than myself and Lt. Payne to lead this service. Please let me know if you can support this detail.

**Gettysburg 14 - 18 November 2024,** if you are interested in going and needing seat in van and lodging please confirm by July 1, 2024. \$150 deposit to be paid to Dean Lamphere mail to 1062 Four Seasons Blvd. Aurora, IL 60504



**Peter J. Hritsko Jr**  
**Commander in Chief**

Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War  
12710 Darrow Rd  
Vermilion, Ohio 44089  
CinC@SUVCW.org

**General Order #16**

Series 2023-2024  
May 27, 2024

The Passing of Past Commander in Chief  
Eugene G. Mortorff

1. It is my sad duty to report the passing of Eugene G. Mortorff Past Commander in Chief on May 26, 2024

2. Eugene was born in 1954 near Gettysburg, PA. and joined the James A. Garfield Camp #1 in Baltimore, Md in 1998. He also joined 3 other Camps in Pennsylvania and Chesapeake and served as Camp Commander and in other capacities including Patriotic Instructor, and Secretary & Treasurer. He received the MSA/w Gold Star August 2019 and the Cornelious Whitehouse Award in August 2017.

3. He was elected Commander in Chief in August 2015 in Richmond, Va. He served as a Department Commander in the Department of Chesapeake.

4. CinC Gene was also in the Sons of Veterans Reserve (SVR) and served as Commander in the 2nd Military District for 2 years.

5. A military veteran, he retired from the U.S. Coast Guard after 20 years

of service and served in the capacities as the Military Training Officer of the Coast Guard Training Center and at Coast Guard Headquarters.

Eugene's second career was a Secondary Public School Teacher in Maryland and taught in 4 different schools there, and then retired in 2012. He also served as a volunteer in the Boy Scouts and provided leadership and Guidance at the Troop, District and National level. Gene was a true leader and was highly respected in the SUVCW and had many friends; he will be missed. He also served in the National Headquarters as the first Assistant Executive Director. Please keep the Mortorff family in your prayers and thoughts.

Funeral arrangements are as follows:  
Dugan Funeral Home

111 Main St.  
Bendersville, Pa. 17306  
Services are Friday June 7, 2024  
Viewing is 1:00pm – 2:00pm  
Funeral is at 2:00pm

It is hereby ordered that the National Website, the Charters of all Departments, Camps, and membership badges be draped in black for a period of 30 days from the date of this General Order.

Ordered this 27th day of May 2024  
Respectfully In Fraternity, Charity & Loyalty  
Peter J. Hritsko, Jr.  
Commander in Chief  
Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War

Attested:  
Daniel W. Murray  
National Secretary  
Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War



We are always looking for content suggestions, comments, Book Reports, Family Civil War stories, advice.

Send your contributions to the Editor at [sarwilliamssa@gmail.com](mailto:sarwilliamssa@gmail.com)

## Member Ancestors

Compiled from current and past member information.

Red Text indicates publication of a biography in the *Camp Communicator*

Current Members		Ancestor		Unit
Darren	Bettinger	Brewer	James M	Pvt, Co. A 78th OH Vol Inf
Theodore J	Chamberlain	Chamberlain	Jeremiah M	Pvt, Co B 176 <sup>th</sup> OH Vol Inf
Keith Alan	Chapman	Stillman	Samuel	Pvt, Co B 94 <sup>th</sup> IL Inf
Steven	Chapman	Stillman	Samuel	Pvt, Co B 94 <sup>th</sup> IL Inf
Jeffrey L	Chubb	Brownell	(William) Henry	Pvt., Merrill's Horse, MO
Rex	Dillman	Yaw	Benjamin Franklin	Pvt, Co G 26 <sup>th</sup> MI Inf Reg,
Glenn	Palen	Palen	Charles	Pvt Co E 128 <sup>th</sup> IN Inf
Rodney Samuel	Krieger	Jacob	Krieger	Pvt, Co I, 19th MI Inf
Charles L	Pfauth Jr	Shopbach	Henry	Pvt, Co F 52 <sup>nd</sup> PA Vol Inf
Charles L	Pfauth Sr	Shopbach	Henry	Pvt, Co F 52 <sup>nd</sup> PA Vol Inf
Ray	Truhn	Goodenough	Alonzo	Pvt, Corp(x2) Sgt. Co A 2 <sup>nd</sup> VT Inf
Steven Allen	Williams	Carter Mountjoy/Munjoy  Wetmore Wetmore Wetmore McKee	Oren George W  Abiather Joy/JA Gilbert Helon/Hellen Albert	Pvt, Co B 186 <sup>th</sup> NY Vol Inf Pvt, 11 <sup>th</sup> MI Vol Cavalry & 1 <sup>st</sup> MI Sharpshooters Pvt 66 <sup>th</sup> IL Inf Pvt 2 <sup>nd</sup> Reg NE Cavalry Pvt 13 <sup>th</sup> Reg IA Inf Pvt Co K 177 <sup>th</sup> Reg OH Inf
Matthew Carter	Williams	Carter	Oren	Pvt, Co B 186 <sup>th</sup> NY Vol Inf
Past Members		Ancestor		Unit
Roger C	Gorske	Hackeman	Frederick H	Cpl, Co L 1 <sup>st</sup> IL Lt Artillery
Kenneth A	Gorske	Hackeman	Frederick H	Cpl, Co L 1 <sup>st</sup> IL Lt Artillery
Dennis L	Gorske	Hackeman	Frederick H	Cpl, Co L 1 <sup>st</sup> IL Lt Artillery
Michael	Gorske	Hackeman	Frederick H	Cpl, Co L 1 <sup>st</sup> IL Lt Artillery
Irving	Hackeman	Hackeman	Frederick H	Cpl, Co L 1 <sup>st</sup> IL Lt Artillery
Richard	Horton	Horton, Jr	William	
Virlin	Dillmam	Mason	Daniel W	
Daniel	Stice	Pegg	Henry Riley	Co E 17 IN
Amasa	Stice	Pegg	Henry Riley	Co E 17 IN
Richard	Gorske	Hackeman	Frederick H	Cpl, Co L 1 <sup>st</sup> IL Lt Artillery
Harold L	Cray	Barrett	George W	Pvt., Co F 54th Reg Ohio Inf

# Camp Communicator

Sons of the Union Veterans of the Civil War

Frederick H. Hackeman CAMP 85

*Happy Birthday to Brothers*

None in June

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